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Abstract 
Jt is not always well understood that Australia has a comprehensive set of social security arrangements with the 
potential to significantly supplement low wages. especially for families with children. These provisions have evolved 
over a long period, beginning with the introduction of child endowment in the 19-10s. During the past twenty-five years, 
the coverage a,( income transfers as a supplement to earnings has been significantly expanded, such that it now provides 
support for partners as well asfor children and, in some cases. for low-paidfu/1-time workers themselves. 
The Australian approach d([(ers in a number o,( ways from approaches typically taken in other countries. This paper 
outlines how the Australian system ofwage supplementation has evolved over the last century. lt charts the evolving 
relationships between the income support system and minimum wages and highlights the ir!fluence of key policy 
changes on those relationships and the consequent financial incentives to take low-paid work. 
In conclusion, the paper reports recent evidence from the OECD which finds that Australia and New Zealand are 
among a small group of countries that consistently provide higher relative incomes for low-wage earners than 
comparable arrangements in most other developed coumries. 
Introduction 
At the core of the Australian social protection system is 
the social security system administered by the Australian 
Government. This prm ides flat-rate income support 
payments to categories of people who are either not 
expected to work. unable to work or unable to find work. 
There are additional payments for a variety of special 
needs (for example, rent assistance for people paying 
private rent) and for people with dependent children. 
Other elements of the broad social support system include 
retirement and disability pensions; a mix of compulsory 
and voluntary occupational superannuation; the health 
care system, based on the national health insurance 
scheme. Medicare; workers' compensation an·angements; 
paid sick leave funded by employers: and other cash and 
in-kind welfare benefits and services, such as subsidised 
child care, public housing and transport (Whiteford and 
Angenant 2001. pp. 7-8). 
Gm ernment income support has a long history in 
Australia, from Federation ( 190 I) to the present. It is 
said to be underpinned by two objectives: first. the 
recognition of government and community responsibility 
to assist those in need; and second. that private provision 
outside the social security system is to be encouraged as 
far as possible (Whiteford and Angenant 2001, p. 13). 
The primru') purpose of the Australian income support 
system. therefore, is to function as a safety net for people 
in need. This distinguishes Australia from most other 
developed countries (apart from New Zealand}, where the 
primru·y principle is one of income maintenance across an 
individual's life cycle - as opposed to relief from 
financial hardship. 
Unlike in most other developed countries, Australia's 
income-support system is not funded by social insurance. 
The comprehensive system of payments is non-
contributory and ftnanced from general revenue. With 
I imited exceptions, payments are means-tested by 
reference to income, and in many cases also to assets. 
In addition to the social safety net, Australian workers are 
protected by the Australian labour market and workplace 
relations institutions. The current legislation provides a 
combination of legislated minima and industrial 
instruments covering minimum wages and conditions of 
emplo)'ment. In relation to minimwn wages 
WorkChoices introduced the Federal Minimum Wage and 
retained components of the previous hierarchical award 
wages with the creation of Australian Pay and 
Classification Scales - establishing minimum wage rates 
below which no Australian worker in the federal 
jw·isdiction may be paid. 1 
Australia is relatively unusual among developed countries 
in that families on low wages frequently have their 
income augmented through general income support and 
family assistance payments, as opposed to specific in-
work benefits. Other couno·ies tend to have specific 
programs available only for people in work (for example, 
the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States) or a 
parallel program for people in work that operates 
alongside their general social assistance program (for 
example, the Working Families Tax Credit in the United 
Kingdom). 
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In Parts 2 and 3 of this paper, respectively, we outline 
how the Australian systems of minimum wages and 
income supports for low-paid workers have evolved over 
the last century. In Parts 4 and 5, we chart the evolving 
relationships between the social security system and 
minimum wages and describe the current interactions 
between wages and transfers. Finally, in Part 6, we 
swnmarise recent evidence from OECD cross-national 
studies which shows that the Australian combination of 
minimum wages and income transfers provides better 
relative outcomes for the lowest paid worker than those in 
almost any other country. 
A brief history of Australian statutory 
• • mmtmum wages 
Before WorkChoices, there had never been one Federal 
minimum wage set by legislation in Australia. However, 
since the early years of Federation (1901) and up to 2005, 
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and its 
predecessors set the wages of workers covered by awards. 
This wage-fixing process became centralised through 
national wage cases and after the introduction of formal 
workplace-level bargaining in the 1990s the AIRC 
continued to determine award wage minima through the 
annual Safety Net Reviews. These wage decisions 
usually flowed also to state awards. 
Before 1945 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the concept of 
a ' basic' or 'living wage' began to gain currency. In 
1907, in the celebrated 'Harvester Judgment ', Higgins J 
expounded the notion of a ' fair and reasonable wage ' as 
that which would be necessary to sustain an average 
employee in ' a condition of frugal comfort estimated by 
current human standards'. The employee to whom this 
standard should apply was assumed to be an unskilled 
male worker (breadwinner) with a dependent wife and 
three children (Hancock 1979b, p. 130). This judgement 
supported the then-prevalent notion than welfare 
outcomes should be achieved by wage-related benefits 
rather than tax assistance or social welfare, either in cash 
or kind {Australian Treasury 2008, p. 195). 
The following structure emerged in the aftermath of the 
Harvester judgment: a basic wage common to all male 
workers irrespective of the work upon which, or the 
industry in which, they were employed; and a secondary 
wage or ' margin for skill, responsibility, or pru1icular 
circumstances of the work or industry in question '. 
Towards the end of World War ll, the principle of the 
basic or living wage was extended to women. However, 
unlike for men, the female needs benchmark was for a 
single woman with no dependants. This approach 
resulted in a female wage of around 50 to 55 per cent of 
the male rate (gradually increased in following years to 
75 per cent). 
Throughout the 1920s, the basic wage was adjusted 
periodically to take into account increases in the cost of 
living (in practice, however, lags often meant a decline in 
real value). During the 1930s and 1940s, there was a 
marked change in emphasis with greater explicit account 
taken of the capacity of the employer to pay. Instead of 
focusing primarily on the needs of the workers, wage-
setting bodies2 began to look more to how those needs 
were to be judged within the broader national context 
(Owens and Riley, p. 291). 
1945 to 1974 
The concept of a basic wage plus margins for skill 
prevailed until the late 1960s when it was overtaken in 
the 1967 National Wage Case by the concept of the ' total 
wage'. It was during this time that the concept of 
'minimum wages' was introduced, with the Commission 
defining its role as setting the minimwn award rates that 
should be paid, as opposed to the maximum or average 
rates. 
A series of National Wage Cases between 1969 and 1974 
addressed the by then contentious issues of the ' family 
wage' and gender equity. In its decision on the 1974 
National Wage Case, the Commission stated its intention 
to discard the family component from the minimum wage 
concept, emphasising also that it was an industrial 
arbitration tribunal, not a social welfare agency, and that 
the care of fami ly needs was principally a matter for 
governments (Nieuwenhuysen 1974, p. 285). 
1980s -1990s 
Indexation of minimum wage increases ended in 1981 
and a minimum wages pause was introduced in 1983. 
From 1983 to 1993, the principal focus in wage fixing 
was upon controlled minimum wage increases determined 
by reference to increases in the cost of living and in 
national productivity - the Accord. 
There was also increasing support for wage determination 
at the level of the enterprise or the workplace. In 1993, 
the Keating Labor Government signalled a major policy 
change in industrial relations that subordinated 
centralised wage fixing to enterprise bargaining. The 
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) made it clear 
that there was a distinction between the arbitrated award 
safety net and the bargaining stream. with the then Prime 
Minister Keating stating that it placed 
primal')' emphasis on bargaining at the workplace 
level within a framework of minimum standards 
provided by arbitral tribunals ... (and) ... under 
which compulsorily arbitrated awards and 
arbitrated wage increases would be there only 
as a safety net [emphasis added] (Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission 2005, p. 7). 
Over this period, minimum wages came to be seen more 
as prut of a formal 'safety net ' of basic terms and 
conditions of employment which underpinned the 
operation of the formal enterprise bargaining process. 
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1996 to present 
In 1996. reforms by the Howard Liberal/National 
coalition government culminated in the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WR Act). The object of the 
WR Act authoritatively established the function of 
minimum wages to provide for an effective award safety 
net of fair and enforceable minimum \\1-ages and 
conditions of employment. 
In the late 1990s and earl) 2000s. there \\as some debate. 
initiated by the 'Five Economists'3 on whether staged 
reduction of minimum wages. in conjunction with 
improvements in the tax-transfer system, would create jobs 
and reduce lUlemployment (Dawkins 1999. 2002: Borland 
2002). However this proposition was disputed by some 
economists and there was also concern about the effect such 
a course might have on low-income households (Richardson 
and Harding 1999. p. 25: Apps 2002a. b). 
In 2006. the Australian Fair Pay Commission was 
established lUlder the Ho ward Govemment' s 
WorkChoices legislation to replace the wage-setting 
functions of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission.~ After election of the Rudd Labor 
Government in late 2007. the Fair Work Bill 2008 
proposes to transfer this function to Fair Work Australia 
in 20 I 0. 
Development of 
transfer system 
workers 
the Australian 
in relation to 
• m come 
low-paid 
The Ausn·alian income transfer system has. like the 
labour market. changed significantly since the end of the 
nineteenth centw·~. Since the earl) days of Federation. 
n·ansfers have evoh·ed from basic pension payments for 
old age. disability and \\ar sen ice to a more extensive 
system of social suppo11. which in many cases pro,·ides 
income supplementation for wage-eaming households. 
What follows is a brief history of the de' elopment of the 
main pa)ments that in the 21 ' 1 Centur) provide supp011 
for dependent children. dependent pat1ners and low-paid 
workers themseh es. 
As:;,·istancefor dependent children 
As stated earlier, the 1907 ·Han ester· family ''age \Yas 
originally asswned to provide adequate support for a wife 
and children (a family of ·about fi,·e· in the original 
decision). For many years. therefore. it was not 
considered necessary to provide additional support to 
meet the needs of lo\\ income \\Orkers \\ith families to 
support. 
The earliest form of family assistance pro\'ided by the 
Commonwealth Government was a lump-sum non-means-
tested maternity allowance. inn·oduced in 1912. This was 
f0llowed by the introduction of child endo\\lnent in 1941 
( Kewley I. 969, pp. 6. 78-80). 
The earliest proposal for child endowment had been made 
by the 1920 Royal Commission on the Basic Wage. on 
the argument that the basic wage was inadequate to 
support a whole family (Hancock 1979b, pp. 133-134; 
Hancock 2004 ). Limited schemes had been introduced in 
1920 for Commonwealth public servants and in 1927 for 
families in New South Wales (Kewley 1969, p. 69). The 
introduction of the national scheme of child endowment 
could be regarded therefore as the fu·st official 
acknowledgement that the ' Harvester' basic wage might 
be insufficient to support a family with more than one 
child.5 Significantly, this early assistance was targeted 
towards all families with children, including families 
receiving income suppo11, rather than to working families. 
Over the years following its introduction, rates of child 
endovvment were increased only sporadically (FaCSIA 
2006. p. 128) and its value fell significantly in real terms. 
As early as 1949, higher rates of assistance were provided 
for families receiving income support, so that by 1972 a 
pensioner or beneficiary with three children received 
almost five times as much in child-related assistance as a 
working family with three children (FaCSIA 2006, pp. 
122, 125. 128 ). 
In 1976. the final report of the Henderson Poverty Inquiry 
recommended the abolition of tax concessions for 
dependent chi ldren and an increase in the rate of Child 
Endowment in order to redirect assistance to poorer 
families. especially those in paid work. The Fraser 
GO\·ernment acted on this recommendation in 1976 by 
combining child endovvment and tax rebates for 
dependent children into a comprehensive system of 
familv allowances. This effectively increased the level of 
• 
assistance for low-income working families with children, 
man) of whom had not paid sufficient tax to benefit from 
the fu ll value of the previous tax rebates (Kewley 1980, 
pp. 97 -I 01 ). 
Despite economic growth, high leve ls of unemployment 
and inflation persisted into the late 1970s and early 
1980s. There was increasing concem about the relativities 
between lUlemployment benefits and wages, particularly 
in the case of large families, where the value of 
unemployment benefits could exceed disposable income 
a' ailable through the combination of minimum wages 
and child endowment. 
This led to the inn·oduction in 1983 of the Family Income 
Supplement (FIS). which provided low-income working 
families with child-related payments equivalent to those 
available to social security pensioners and beneficiaries. 
The objecti, e of the payment was to ensure that such 
fami lies would always have more disposable income in 
employment than in lUlemployment. FIS was later 
expanded and transformed into Family Allowance 
Supplement as pa11 of the family allowance reforms 
introduced by the Hawke Labor government in 1987. 
Family Tax Benefit (FTB) was introduced in 2000 as pru1 
of a package of reforms accompanying the introduction of 
the goods and serYices tax. Rat~s of. payment "':'ere 
increased and the income test was hberahsed at that ttme 
and a number oftimes in subsequent years. 
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Support for dependent spouses 
Changing social perceptions about the role of women in 
the labour force have also changed the way the Australian 
social secw·ity system treats dependent spouses. 
Before 1995. wages were presumed sufficient to support a 
spouse and unemployed married men received a married 
rate of unemployment benefit. consistent with their 
assumed role as the family breadwinner. However, as the 
Iabow· force participation of married women grew, it 
challenged the asswnption that one partner should 
naturally be presumed dependent on the other (Cass 1988. 
pp. 227-240; Douglas, et all993). ln addition, minimum 
wages had not kept pace with income limits for 
unemployment benefits and there was growing concern 
over the incentives for mcUTied breadwinners to take low-
paid work (Cass 1988, pp. 1 07-127; DSS 1993; Whit lock 
1994). 
In 1994. the mru1·ied unemplo)'ment benefit was split into 
two parts. with one half paid to the unemployment 
benefician and the other to his or her spouse in the form 
of a pa11n~· allowance. Fw'ther changes occurred in the 
following year, when the mruTied unemplo)'ment benefit 
was full) disaggregated. so that each pa11ner had to 
qualify for income support in their own right. This 
change was accompanied by the inn·oduction of a ne\\ 
parenting allowance. for one member of a couple with 
dependent children under 16, and new income-testing 
anangements for couples. These aimed to ensure that 
while both were on payment, each had their entitlement 
assessed on their own income, with a prumer's income 
taken into account only once it was sufficient to preclude 
the payment of their Ov\TI allowance (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1994 ). 
Assistance for the low-paid and the unemployed 
Prior to 1945. relief for ·able-bodied' unemployed people 
was undertaken b) state governments. often in association 
\\~th church charity agencies. Customary methods of 
assistance were through rations or sustenance. or b) 
prO\ iding food or wages in retwn for relief work (Ke\\ Iey 
1969. p. 4; Cass 1988. pp. 11-12). 
In 1945 the Commonwealth government introduced an 
unemployment benefits scheme. The structure of benefits 
embodied assumptions that: 
• unemployed people would only be out of work for 
a shot1 time; 
• unemployed people would get a full-time job; and 
• only one person in a couple would be actively 
looking for work ,,;th the other partner. usually 
the wife, being economically dependent (Cass 
1998, pp.l5-18). 
Unemployment increased significantly during the 
recession of the early 1970s and despite high levels of 
economic growth in the subsequent recovery, high levels 
of unemployment persisted into the late 1970s and early 
1980s. At the same time there was significant growth in 
part-time work. This led to successive liberalisations of 
the unemployment benefits income test from 1980 
onwards to improve incentives for unemployed people to 
take up part-time and/or casual work. 
The inevitable consequence of these changes was to 
increase the income cut-out point for benefits and thus to 
erode relative incentives to make the move from part-time 
to full-time work. By the late 1980s concerns were again 
being raised about the relativities between unemployment 
benefits (especially when combined with part-time work) 
and the incomes of people in low-paid full-time work 
(Cass 1988. pp. 107-127. Whitlock 1994). 
In July 1995. as part of the Working Nation policy 
package. substantial changes were made to the structure 
of income support for unemployed people, to improve 
work incentives and also to recognise the increasing 
labow· force participation of women. The maximum 
withdrawal rate for benefits (by then called allowances) 
was reduced from I 00 per cent to 70 per cent. This aimed 
to ensw-e that people on unemployment payments would 
always increase their disposable income by earning more 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1994). 
In 2005, the income test for allowance payments was 
further liberalised, this time as part of the Welfare to 
Work policy package. From this point on, it has been 
possible for people in the lowest-paid full-time jobs to 
recehe income supplementation through Newstart 
Allowance. Australia's main unemployment payment. 
The historical relationship between wages 
and transfers 
Unemployment benefit and the minimum wage 
The relationship between rninimwn wages and the level 
of unemployment benefits is an important indicator of ~e 
incentive for unemployed people to take up low-pa1d 
work. Figw·e 2 shows a time series of the ratio between 
unemployment benefits and gross income at the Federal 
Minimwn Wage (FMW) equivalent6, from the 
introduction of unemployment benefits in 1945 until 
2008. 
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Figure 2: Ratio of unemployment benefits to gross income* at FMW -equivalent wage, single adult and couple 
with three children, 1946 to 2008 
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•Gross income at minimum wage includes any available income transfers, where applicable. 
The replacement rates modelled here, for a single adult 
without children and a single-earner 'Harvester' family of 
two adults and three children, are not true replacement 
rates as the financial modelling does not take account of 
income tax. Nevertheless, they provide a reasonable 
proxy for trends in replacement rates over that period. 
As Figure 2 shows, financial incentives for single people 
to take up low-paid employment have always been strong, 
with the gross replacement rate rarely exceeding 45 per 
cent. For families with children, however, it has been a 
different story, with the gross replacement rate climbing 
steadily through the 1960s and 1970s, to a point where 
for larger family types it was briefly higher than l 00 per 
cent. 
The cumulative effects of the changes to family 
assistance since 1983 and unemployment benefits since 
the mid-1990s have helped to reduce the gross 
replacement rate for a couple with three children to less 
than 80 per cent, where it has been relatively stable over 
the past decade or so. 
Overlap between income support and minimum 
wages 
Figure 3 illustrates an alternative perspective on the work 
incentive effects of unemployment benefits and minimum 
wages. It charts the ratio of the cut-out point for benefit 
(the amount of gross income at which benefit entitlement 
is lost under the income test) to the FMW-equivalent 
wage. This ratio is especially indicative of incentives to 
work full-time relative to working part-time and 
continuing to receive income support. 
For a single adult~ there has been a steady increase in the 
ratio, as the income test for unemployment benefits has 
been eased. Significant increases are associated with the 
Working Nation changes in 1996 and with Welfare to 
Work in 2006. 
Figure 3: Ratio of income support cut-out point to FMW-equivalent wage, single adult and partnered person 
with three children, 1946 to 2008 
Ratio (%) 
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Source: AFPC Modelling 
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For the partnered beneficiary, on the other hand, the 
combination of a benefit that included payments for an 
unemployed spouse and three children with 
improvements in the income test meant that, consistently 
from about 1985 onwards, a person taking a full-time 
low-wage job could be financially worse off than 
someone working part-time at a higher hourly wage and 
retaining entitlement to a part-rate benefit. This situation 
was remedied through two major policy changes. 
• The first step involved transferring child payments 
to the primary carer in 1993. This significantly 
reduced the amount of unemployment benefits 
payable to the breadwinner and also improved the 
financial transition into work, by providing 
continuity of assistance for children. 
• The second, more significant, change was the 
disaggregation of benefits in 1995, which meant 
that the partner of an unemployment beneficiary 
could claim and receive a payment in their own 
right Because income from work was offset first 
against the tmemployed person's benefit before 
reducing the benefit of his or her partner, the cut-
out point for the individual fell dramatically, 
despite the fact that the income test was 
significantly eased at the same time. 
Real gross income at FMW-equivalent wages 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative effect of all of these 
developments in the social security system on the real 
gross incomes of families on FMW-equivalent wages. 
For both the single adult and the family of five, there was 
a consistent upward trend tmtil the early 1980s. Through 
all that earlier time period the gross income for the family 
was only marginally higher than that of a single adult. 
Since the mid-1980s, however, the gross income for a 
single minimwn wage-earner has been roughly stable in 
real terms, but the real income of the family of five has 
increased by around 60 per cent. 
Figure 4: Real gross income at FMW-equivalent wages, single adult and couple with three children, 1949 to 2008 
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Current interactions between wages and 
transfers 
The next two figures illustrate how earnings and income 
support payments combine for workers with varying 
levels of earnings. The cases modelled are a single 
person without children (Figure 5) and a single-earner 
Couple, 3 children 
couple with three children (Figure 6), both assumed to be 
paying sufficient private rent to receive maximum rent 
assistance. 
For a single person, income support when out of work is a 
little under $15,000 a year. This tapers out steadily as 
earnings rise to an annual income of around $26,700, 
about $1,600 a year below the cutTent level of the FMW. 
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Figure 5: Components of disposable income, single adult, September 2008 
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The picture is considerably more complex for the couple 
with three children, depicted in Figtrre 6. When out of 
work, this family is entitled to: 
• income support for the ftrst partner: 
• income support for the second partner: and 
• Family Tax Benefit Parts A and B. 
All of these benefits can be retained to some degree when 
one partner moves into low-paid employment. The 
partner moving into work retains a part-rate of income 
support until earnings reach around $19,500. Meanwhile, 
the non-working partner retains income support until 
eamings reach around $37,500. 
o Income support 
Family Tax Benefit Part A (FTBA), the per-child 
component ofFTB, is paid at maximum rates until annual 
earnings are more than $42,600, about 50 per cent more 
than the annual FMW. The family also recei\'es Family 
Tax Benefit B (FTBB). a payment made when one 
partner earns less than around $23,000 a year. 
As Figure 6 shows, a single-earner family with three 
children and one eamer on the FMW of just over $28.000 
a year derives about half of its household income fi·om 
social secw·ity transfers (around $5,500 a year in income 
support for the parent and over $20,000 in family tax 
benefits). This contrasts with the single adult on the 
FMW, where all income is derived fi·om private earnings. 
Figure 6: Components of disposable income, single-earner couple with 3 children, September 2008 
Disposable income 
($pa) 
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How Australia compares with other OECD 
countries 
In this paper we have outlined how Australia has evolved 
a complex system of income supplementation for 
individuals in low-paid work. In its recent surveys of 
wages and benefit structures across the developed world, 
the OECD has found that a small nwnber of mostly 
English-speaking countries (Australia and New Zealand, 
along with the United Kingdom (UK), Poland and 
Ireland) consistently provide the highest relative incomes 
to minimum-wage-earning households. 
Table 1 swnmarises information from the recent OECD 
(2007) publication, Benefits and Wages 2007, which 
compares wages and benefit systems across OECD 
member countries. The table reports the results of 
disposable income modelling for three family types with 
one person earning the relevant country's statutory 
minimum wage- a single adult. a single parent with two 
children and a couple with two children. The primary 
measw-e is equivalised household disposable income 
relative to median equivalised household disposable 
income for the country as a whole. The fh e countries 
which consistently rank in the top five are highlighted in 
the table. 
In both New Zealand and Australia a single person on the 
minimwn wage in 2005 had disposable income of around 
80 per cent of the median in equivalised tenns. This is no 
doubt related to the fact that these two countries have 
among the highest minimwn wages in OECD countries 
(AFPC 2008, Appendix D, pp. 107-110). 
The analysis also shows that, with few exceptions, single 
adults on minimwn wages have higher relative incomes 
than the other family types. In the highest ranked 
countries, equivalised incomes range, for the single parent 
family, from 64 per cent of the median in New Zealand to 
93 per cent in the UK and, for the couple, from around 55 
per cent in New Zealand to 82 per cent in the UK. 
Australia and the UK have the smallest differences across 
the three family types. 
Bearing in mind that a commonly accepted poverty line 
used by the OECD is 60 per cent of median equivalised 
household income, these data show that the UK, Australia 
and Ireland consistently provide minimum wage earners 
with disposable incomes at or above this line. Poland and 
New Zealand do well in relation to single adults, but are 
less generous to low-paid families with children. 
Table 1: Net incomes of full-time minimum wage earners as percentage of median household income and 
associated country ranking, various OECD countries, 2005 
Family type 
Country Single aduJt Single parent, two Couple, two children 
children 
%of median (rank) % ofmediao (rank) % ofmedian (rank) 
Australia 79.2 (3) 88.0 (2} 74.8 (2} 
Bdgium 64.0 (I 0) 49.7 (11) 47.1 (10) 
Canada 46.9 ( 17) 47.7 (12) 42.7 (14) 
Czech Republic 5~.8 ( 14) 53.1 (9) 53.2 (7) 
France 71.5 (6) 52.~ (I 0) 45.4 (13) 
Greece 69.1 (8) 42.1 ( 14) 36.4 ( 15) 
I lungary 60.5 (11) 55.8 (7) 47.0 ( 11) 
Ireland 73.6 (5) 76.7 (3) 60.0 (3) 
Japan 53.6 ( 13) 58.0 (6) 53.3 (6) 
Luxembourg ~o .., ) ·- ( 15) 45.5 (13) 52.5 (8 
Netherlancb 68.4 (9} 55.6 (8) 47.2 (9 
New Zealand 82.1 (2) 63.8 -(5) 54.5 (5 
Poland 78.3 (4} 69.6 (4) 58.0 (4) 
Portugal 55 .6 (I~) 38.9 (16) 45.5 (12) 
Spain 48.8 ( 17) 30.7 ( 18) 26.6 (18) 
1 urkey 70.9 (7) 40.9 (15) 35.5 (16) 
United Kingdom 95.1 (1) 93.0 (I) 81.9 (1) 
United States 34.8 ( 18) 36.0 (17) 34.5 ( 17) 
~ource : 0 I. CD Wage' and Bene fil s 2007 ; ~ee S1a1l ink http: dx.doi.org/1 0.1 787/141016253821 
It must be acknowledged that only countries with 
statutor) minimum wages are compared in Table I. 
Others. such as the Nordic countries. which nevertheless 
haYe well-regulated and relatively high wages. are not 
represented here. However, other OECD data show that 
the top-ranked countries in relation to minimum wage 
eamers also tend to offer more generous basic levels of 
social assistance. For example. the UK also ranks first in 
tenns of the level of out-of-work income as a proportion 
of median equivalised income and, while Australia is 
ranked tenth for assistance to single adults, it is ranked 
third and second, respectively, for its levels of assistance 
to single parents and couples with children (OECD 2007, 
pp.77-79). 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2008 550 
eo 
t)( 
' 
• 
Conclusion 6. As no single FMW existed until 2006, a variety of 
benchmarks have been used to compile a series of 
FMW -equivalent wages - for example, the average 
of State basic wages and the wage specified in the 
Federal Metal Industry Award for an unskilled 
(classification C14) employee. This latter was 
widely regarded as the de facto FMW immediately 
prior to 2006. 
Over the last century, and even more so over the past 
twenty-five years, the Australian wages and benefits 
systems have been in a more or less continuous state of 
evolution. In recent years, particular attention has been 
paid to the need to provide adequate incentives for 
unemployed and other jobless people to take up paid 
work. 
Australia has moved from the situation where the welfare 
needs of low-skilled workers and their families were 
largely met through the level of their wages to one in 
which the living standards of low-wage earners are 
supported through both minimum wages that are 
relatively generous in international terms and a 
comprehensive set of income transfers. In combination, 
Australia's minimum wage and social security system 
now deliver relative disposable incomes for low-wage 
workers that are among the highest in the developed 
world. 
Notes 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
With the exception of 'junior' workers and those 
to whom training arrangements apply who were 
award free prior to 2006. The AIRC retained a 
transitional wage-setting function for employees 
who prior to 2006 had been in the federal 
jurisdiction and covered by the then Constitutional 
conciliation and arbitration head of power but after 
2006 could not be covered by the Constitutional 
corporations head of power. 
Commonwealth Cotrrt of Conciliation and 
Arbitration and various state wage-setting tribunals 
The Five Economists (Peter Dawkins, John 
Freebairn, Ross Garnaut, Michael Keating and 
Chris Richardson) wrote an open letter to the 
Australian Prime Minister in October 1998, 
suggesting a freeze on wage adjustments, 
combined with appropriate tax credits for low-
wage earners in low-income families (Dawkins 
2002, p. 1). 
The AIRC retained a transitional wage-setting 
function for employees who prior to 2006 had 
been in the federal jurisdiction covered by the then 
Constitutional conciliation and Arbitration head of 
power but after 2006 could not be covered by the 
Constitutional corporations head of power. 
Until July 1950 child endowment was not paid for 
the first child in a family. It is interesting to note 
that, almost coincident with the introduction of 
child endowment, the Basic Wage Inquiry 1940-
41 delivered a judgement that found the basic 
wage was adequate only to support a family of 
three (two adults and one child) (Kewley 1980, p. 
91 ). 
Disclaimer 
Any conclusions drawn and opinions expressed in this 
paper are those of the authors and should not be taken to 
represent the conclusions or opinions of the Australian 
Fair Pay Commission or its Secretariat. 
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